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I. Background
During the Uruguay Round, various agreements were negotiated in the Rules area. One,
the Agreement on Safeguards, was a first agreement expanding on the rights and obligations
Members had under article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATYD
of 1994. Two others were refinements of prior Codes dealing with rights and obligations
under articles VI and XVI of GATT 1994. The Agreement on Implementation of article
VI of GATT 1994 (Antidumping Agreement) represented the third attempt by the multi-
lateral trading system to work through the rights and obligations of nations under article
VI of GAT 1994 (and its predecessor GATT 1947) which, inter alia, condemns injurious
dumping. Similarly, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement) was the second cut at defining what, if any, limitations exist on nations' rights
to provide subsidies under article XVI of GATT 1994 (and its predecessor GATT 1947)
or how countervailing duty investigations should proceed under article VI of GATT 1994.
The Antidumping and SCM Agreements are quite detailed on a host of issues, both sub-
stantive (e.g., definition of dumping and actionable subsidies) and procedural (e.g., time for
questionnaire responses, content of notices), and should go a long way to ensuring greater
uniformity in administration by Member nations. While the Agreements required a number
of changes to preexisting U.S. law, the Agreements incorporated much of U.S. law and
practice into their terms.
At the same time the new Antidumping and SCM Agreements became effective many
nations undertook significant tariff liberalization. This was particularly true for many im-
portant developing countries which historically had either high tariff bindings or no tariff
bindings at all on many products. As nations broadened their tariff liberalization and
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reduced various non-tariff barriers, not surprisingly, more nations found the need to utilize
World Trade Organization (WTO)-authorized trade remedies to address import problems.
For example, the VWTO reported that during the 1995-2001 period its Members (which
for the reporting period did not include China nor various countries in the former Soviet
Union who have become active users-for example, the Russian Federation and Ukraine)'
had initiated some 1,845 antidumping investigations, 143 countervailing duty investiga-
tions, and 65 safeguard measures covering a significant number of product sectors:
Antidumping, Countervail, Safeguards Investigations:
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For instance, safeguard measures, while the smallest in number, often include broad product
ranges.
Developing countries reported having initiated 55.7 percent of antidumping cases, 18.2
percent of countervailing duty cases, and 67.7 percent of safeguard actions-53.4 percent
of all initiations.' While the historic major users-the European Union, United States,
Canada, and Australia-all continued as major developed country users, many developing
countries became active users including India, Argentina, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico
(which had been a very active user even before the WTO following accession to the GATT),
South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru.4 Even an historic
opponent to antidumping and safeguard measures like Japan found itself initiating several
antidumping actions and three safeguard actions in recent years., As the author has argued
elsewhere, increased use of WTO-sanctioned rules by WTO Members is a good devel-
1. For a discussion of China's antidumping, subsidy, and safeguards regulations, see TERENCE P. STEWART
ET AL., ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: BASELINE OF
COMMITMENTS, INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-PRC TRADE RELATIONS AND U.S. SE-
CURITY INrERESTS, A REPORT AND SELECTED ANNEXES PREPARED FOR THE U.S.-CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COM-
MISSION BY THE LAW OFFICES OF STEWART AND STEWART, Attachment 9 (Transnational Publishers, 2002).
2. \17O, Report (2001) of the Committee on Safeguards to the Councilfor Trade in Goods, G/L/494, Annex 2
(Oct. 31, 2001), at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/L/494.doc; WTO, Report (2000) of tbe Com-
mittee on Safeguards, G/L/409, Annex 2 (Nov. 23, 2000), at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/L/
409.doc; \VTO, Anti-dumping, at http://wcw.wto.org/english/tratop-e/adp-e/adp-e.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
2003); \VTO, Initiations: by sector from 01/01/95 to 30/06/02, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/scm-e/
scmstattab4_e.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
3. See TERENCE P. STEWART ET AL., RULES IN A RULES-BASED \VTO: KEY TO GROWTH; THE CHALLENGES
AHEAD 23 (2002).
4. See id. at 22.
5. See, e.g., VTO, Committee on Antidumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report UnderArticle 16.4 ofthe Agree-
ment: Japan, G/ADP/N/92/JPN (Aug. 23, 2002), at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/ADP/
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opment for the trading system, not a negative.6 Indeed, maintaining strong trade laws is
important for the continued support for further liberalization not only in developed coun-
tries like the United States, but also for WTO developing country Members to justify to
their citizens the trade liberalization undertaken as part of WTO accession or continued
participation in the multilateral system.
Use of the agreements by Members has been the subject of frequent challenges within
the WTO, with the United States being the most frequent subject of WTO disputes in the
Rules area during the last seven and two-thirds years:
WTO Disputes Involving Rules Agreements and Other Trade Remedies
(Ranked by date of panel report)
Panel AB Major Agreement(s)
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Key: AB = Appellate Body; bolding = decisions recommending that U.S. bring measures into conformity
N92JPN.doc; WATO, Committee on Safeguards, Agreement on Safeguards on Initiation of an Investigation and the
Reasons for it: Japan, G/SG/N/6/JPN/ I (Jan. 5, 2001), at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/SG/
N6JPNl.doc.
6. See STEWART ET AL., supra note 3.
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U.S. trade remedies have been the subject of over half of all of the trade remedy cases
resulting in a report. Out of the seventeen cases challenging U.S. trade remedies, the United
States has been asked to modify its measures in thirteen cases.
WTO disputes of all types have an extraordinary success rate within the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding (DSU) with nearly 90 percent of challenges being sustained, at least
in part. This is true in the Rules area as well.7 While legislation implementation and prac-
tices vary among governments, no system permits overall greater participation and due
process rights than the U.S. system does. Moreover, since much of what is in the agreements
flows from U.S. law and practice, it is surprising that so many challenges have been filed
against U.S. law and practices. The reason for the lack of challenges to decisions by other
countries is not clear. It could be the result of the lack of transparency in the system, because
the challenges are focused on certain contentious issues that were not specifically addressed
during the Uruguay Round (e.g., whether subsidies to an entity survive the sale of the
entity's assets in an arm's length transaction) in which the United States has been involved,
or still other reasons. To many U.S. domestic users and, I believe, the agencies involved,
the challenges and resulting decisions are viewed as having created WTO obligations not
agreed to by the United States during the Uruguay Round.
II. Launch of the Doha Development Agenda Round
Last November when the fourth WTO Ministerial was held in Doha, Qatar, a work
program was agreed upon to move forward the built-in agenda from Uruguay Round agree-
ments and various other matters of interest to the Members. Many U.S. trade remedy users
concerned about the intentions of those seeking the reopening of the Antidumping and
SCM Agreements, urged the Administration not to support the reopening of these agree-
ments as part of the work program. More than sixty Senators expressed similar concerns
to the Administration prior to Doha.8
Nonetheless, as part of the process to achieve a successful launch to negotiations, the
United States agreed to the inclusion of two paragraphs dealing with Rules in the Ministerial
Declaration coming out of Doha. There was also one paragraph, potentially relevant to
Rules, dealing with the DSU:
WTO RULES
28. In the light of experience and of the increasing application of these instruments by Mem-
bers, we agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines under the Agree-
ments on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures, while preserving the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of these
Agreements and their instruments and objectives, and taking into account the needs of de-
veloping and least-developed participants. In the initial phase of the negotiations, partic-
ipants will indicate the provisions, including disciplines on trade distorting practices, that
they seek to clarify and improve in the subsequent phase. In the context of these negoti-
7. See TERENCE P. STEWART & AMtY S. DWYER, HANDBOOK ON WTO TRADE REMEDY DisPuTEs: THE FIRST
Six YEARS (1995-2000) 391-93 (2001). Indeed, out of the thirty-two cases involving the Antidumping, SCM,
or Safeguards Agreements, panels or the Appellate Body have found violations in twenty-eight cases or 87.5
percent of the time. See supra Attachment.
8. See U.S. Seeks To Put Hold On Antidumping, Subsidy Negotiations In WTO, Vol. 19, No. 40, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE 1, Oct. 5, 2001.
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ations, participants shall also aim to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries
subsidies, taking into account the importance of this sector to developing countries. We
note that fisheries subsidies are also referred to in paragraph 31.
29. We also agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures
under the existing WNTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements. The negoti-
ations shall take into account the developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING
30. We agree to negotiations on improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding. The negotiations should be based on the work done thus far as well as any
additional proposals by Members, and aim to agree on improvements and clarifications
not later than May 2003, at which time we will take steps to ensure that the results enter
into force as soon as possible thereafter.'
In addition, paragraph 12 of the Declaration calls for addressing various "implementation"
issues raised by developing countries. There are a total of thirty-three such issues raised in
connection with the Antidumping and SCM Agreements. 0
The language in paragraph 28 was included at the United States' insistence that any
negotiations preserve the effectiveness of the Antidumping and SCM Agreements in dealing
with unfair trade practices." Thus, U.S. trade negotiators have committed to consider only
those proposed changes to the Antidumping and SCM Agreements that:
1. clarify and improve disciplines;
2. preserve the Agreements' basic concepts, principles, and effectiveness and their instruments
and objectives; and
3. take into account the needs of developing and least-developed participants.
III. Trade Promotion Authority
On August 6, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2002 12 as part of the Trade Act of 2002. The Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act gives the President fast-track authority for trade agreements negotiated dur-
ing the Doha Round. Among the principal U.S. trade negotiating objectives, Congress
identified (1) preservation of U.S. ability to enforce rigorously its trade remedy laws, and
(2) avoidance of agreements that lessen the effectiveness of those laws:
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to trade remedy laws
are-
(A) to preserve the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws, including
the antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and avoid agreements that
lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade, espe-
cially dumping and subsidies, or that lessen the effectiveness of domestic and interna-
tional safeguard provisions, in order to ensure that United States workers, agricultural
9. WTO, Ministerial Declaration, VT/MIN(0)/DEC/I, at 6 (Nov. 20, 2001), at http://docsonline.
wto.org/DDFDocunientslt/WT/minO I/DEC 1.doc (emphasis added) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration].
10. See TERENCE P. STEWART, AFTER DOHA: THE CHANGING ATTFITUDE & IDEAS OF THE NEW VvWTO ROUND
14-16 (2002).
11. See U.S. Wrestles With Scope, Direction for Talks on Trade Rules, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 13, 200 1, Special
Report, at 10.
12. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authorit Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3801 (2002).
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producers, and firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal
trade concessions; and
(B) to address and remedy market distortions that lead to dumping and subsidization, including
overcapacity, cartelization, and market-access barriers.'3
As noted, Congress specifically directed the President to address the causes of dumping and
subsidization.
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 also identifies adherence to the
standard of review as one of the U.S. negotiating objectives with respect to dispute settle-
ment and enforcement of trade agreements:
The principle negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to dispute settlement
and enforcement of trade agreements are-
(C) to seek adherence by panels convened under the Dispute Settlement Understanding and
by the Appellate Body to the standard of review applicable under the Uruguay Round
Agreement involved in the dispute, including greater deference, where appropriate, to the
fact-finding and technical expertise of national investigating authorities.'
4
In its Conference Report, Congress expressed concern with the recent pattern of negative
panel and Appellate Body decisions in Rules cases:
(T]he Conferees believe that... support for continued trade expansion requires that dispute
settlement procedures under international trade agreements not add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in such agreements. Therefore, the recent pattern of decisions by dispute
settlement panels and the U/7O Appellate Body to impose obligations and restrictions on the use of
antidumping, countervailing and safeguard measures by WTO members has raised concerns, and
Congress is concerned that such bodies appropriately apply the standard of review contained
in Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement, to provide deference to a permissible inter-
pretation by a WTO member and to the evaluation by a member of the facts where that
evaluation is unbiased and objective and the establishment of the facts is proper.'5
Those concerns were repeated in the "Findings" section of the enacted bill.,6 Indeed, on
May 14, 2002, many members of the Senate voted in favor of the Dayton-Craig Trade
Remedy Law Amendment, which would have prevented fast-track consideration of parts
of any trade agreement changing U.S. trade remedy laws. 7 While the enacted bill does not
include the Dayton-Craig limitations on the President's negotiating authority, it does re-
quire the President to report to Congress on (1) the range of proposals that could require
13. Id. § 3802(b)(14) (emphasis added). The language used in the Conference Report to describe the Pres-
ident's mission was even more emphatic:
The Conferees recognize the importance of preserving the ability of the United States to enforce
rigorously its trade remedy laws, including the antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard laws.
Because this issue is significant to many Members of Congress in both the House and Senate, the
Conferees have made this priority a principal negotiating objective. Negotiators must also avoid agree-
ments that lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade, as well as
domestic and international safeguard provisions.
H.R. REP. No. 107-624, at 156 (2002) (emphasis added).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(12)(C).
15. H.R. REP. No. 107-624, at 150 (2002) (emphasis added).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 3801(b)(3).
17. S. AMDT. 3408, 108th Cong. (2002).
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amendments to title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (antidumping/countervailing duty pro-
visions) or chapter 1 of title H of the Trade Act of 1974 (safeguards), and (2) how those
proposals relate to U.S. trade negotiating objectives on trade remedies."
Thus, Congress gave the President express guidance on U.S. negotiating objectives in
the Doha Round with respect to trade remedy agreements. Specifically, Congress author-
ized the Administration to negotiate agreements that:
1. preserve the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws;
2. avoid lessening the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade
or safeguard provisions;
3. address and remedy market distortions that lead to dumping and subsidization; and
4. seek adherence by panels and by the Appellate Body to the standard of review (such as in
Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement) including greater deference, where appropri-
ate, to the fact-finding and technical expertise of national investigating authorities. 9
IV. Questions Posed
(a) Should the United States be prepared to discuss "improvements" to WVTO
antidumping and countervailing duty disciplines in the Doha Round?
With the Doha process going forward, the United States can proceed down a number
of paths. It could simply review proposals put forward by other nations and evaluate them
against the Declaration's language on "negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving dis-
ciplines under the Agreements on Implementation of article VI of the GATT 1994 and on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, while preserving the basic concepts, principles and
effectiveness of these Agreements and their instruments and objectives."20 Few, if any, of
the proposals put forward to date will likely meet the standard articulated, particularly
"preserving effectiveness." This approach has the advantage of leaving the agreement
largely unmodified at the end of the process.
A second approach would have the United States take a more proactive position, seeking
to obtain clarification of existing terms and provisions to restore the rights the United States
understood existed under the Antidumping and SCM Agreements that have been drawn
into question by WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions, and pursuing conclusion to
issues such as circumvention that have not been resolved despite the longstanding mandate
to do so." As the United States is just getting to the phase of having to examine imple-
mentation of various losses before the DSU, such an approach has the advantage of re-
turning the agreements to the status quo ante-that is, what the United States understood
its rights and obligations to have been in the first instance but which may be upset by WTO
panel and Appellate Body decisions while obtaining clarification on matters historically
important to the United States (such as anti-circumvention).
A third permutation would be to clarify the agreements to more closely parallel U.S. law,
regulations, and practice. This would maintain the effectiveness of the agreements and
18. 19 U.S.C. § 3804(d)(3).
19. See id.
20. Ministerial Declaration, supra note 9, at 6.
21. In the Decision on Anti-Circumvention, WTO Members referred the issue of anti-circumvention to
the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices. See Decision on Anti-Circumvention, reprinted in THE LEGA. TEXTS:
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 397 (2000). While the Com-
mittee established an Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention, no draft text has been forthcoming.
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provide clarification on issues where there is no specific language in the agreement. This
would also have the advantage of bringing foreign laws and regulations into conformity
with U.S. laws and regulations on issues like transparency and due process.
A fourth permutation would be to add to the prior agenda review of trading partner laws,
regulations, and practices and seek clarifications in the agreements either to add practices
that make the agreements more effective or to clarify that such practices are not envisioned
where the practices are viewed by the Administration as incompatible with U.S. law and
practice.
To this practitioner, the debate should shift from whether negotiations should proceed
(they will proceed) to how the Administration and Congress should evaluate the results of
any negotiations. The last three options better permit the United States to maintain agree-
ments that are effective.
(b) Does the risk of abusive foreign AD/CVD actions on U.S. exports justify a broad
renegotiation of the WTO Agreement?
The answer to this question is a resounding "no." To date, the United States has pursued
relatively few antidumping and countervailing duty cases against U.S. exports to the WTO
DSU. With the extraordinary voting record of WTO Panels, if there is concern about
"abuse" by our trading partners (concern, which, to date, is not borne out by the numbers
of cases brought against the United States; the United States was [before the WTO] and
is now subject to cases, usually brought by our major trading partners), the United States
should demonstrate that such problems cannot be addressed through the DSU, through
the Committee process, or bilateral consultations. Such a showing cannot be made on the
challenges pursued to date. Indeed, the U.S. trade remedies have been continuously subject
to GATT and now WTO panel scrutiny.
This being said, this author is fully supportive as a general matter of greater transparency
and due process in other nations' antidumping and countervailing duty regimes. Ensuring
U.S. exporters have rights abroad comparable to those enjoyed by foreign producers in
U.S. proceedings makes sense and is addressed in option three in the previous section.
(c) Can the WTO address the underlying causes of antidumping, for example, high
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and lax competition laws, that contribute to interna-
tional price discrimination?
The question is overly simplistic and only addresses dumping. It is true that high tariffs
and various non-tariff barriers (NTBs) can contribute to international price discrimination.
Tariff liberalization and addressing specific NTBs can be effective in reducing the under-
lying cause of dumping in certain circumstances. For economies in which economic systems
have many similarities (e.g., the United States and Canada), a move to liberalized trade has
reduced the incidence of trade disputes in many (but not all) sectors and overall compared
to other nations. A reduced caseload is not the same as the end of the need for remedies.
One can expect some reductions in trade actions as tariff barriers and NTBs are reduced
or eliminated with other nations. Similarly, improved competition laws and enforcement
will address the underlying cause of some forms of dumping. Distortions that exist in ag-
riculture amongst many countries, the integration of non-market economies into the global
system, structural excess capacity problems in certain sectors, and the prevalence of cross-
subsidization by many companies are a few of the other areas that can result in dumping
situations arising and being pursued under trade remedies.
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GATT/WTO Rules Disputes Against the United States
(Ranked by date of panel report)*
Panel Major Agreement/Code
No. Case Name Case Number Report Cited
1 US-CVD Measures WT/DS212 7/31/2002 SCM Agreement
2 US-Steel Plate WT/DS206 7/29/2002 SCM Agreement
3 US-Section 129(c)(l) WT/DS221 7/15/2002 Antidumping Agreement/
SCM Agreement
4 US-Corrosion-Resistant Steel WT/DS213 7/3/2002 SCM Agreement
5 US-Line Pipe WTIDS202 10/29/2001 Safeguards Agreement
6 US-Export Restraints WT/DS 194 6/29/2001 SCM Agreement
7 US-Hot-Rolled Steel WT/DS 184 2/28/2001 Antidumping Agreement
8 US-Stainless Steel WT/DS 179 12/22/2000 Antidumping Agreement
9 US-Lamb Meat WT/DS177/178 12/21/2000 Safeguards Agreement
10 US-Wheat Gluten Ff/DS 166 7/31/2000 Safeguards Agreement
11 US-AD Act gapan) WV/DS 162 5/29/2000 Antidumping Agreement
12 US-AD Act (EC) WT/DS136 3/31/2000 Antidumping Agreement
13 US-Carbon Steel WT/DS138 12/23/1999 SCM Agreement
14 US-FSC WT/DS108 10/8/1999 SCM Agreement
15 US-DRAMS WT/DS99 1/29/1999 Antidumping Agreement
16 US-Bismuth Carbon Steel SCM/185 11/15/1994 Subsidies Code
17 US-Stainless Steel Plate ADP/ 117 and Corr.1* 2/24/1994 Antidumping Code
18 US-Softwood Lumber SCM/162 2/19/1993 Subsidies Code
19 US-Salmon (CVD) SCM/153 BISD 41S/576 12/4/1992 Subsidies Code
20 US-Salmon (AD) ADP/87 BISD 41S/229 11/30/1992 Antidumping Code
21 US-Cement &s Cement Clinker ADP/82 9/7/1992 Antidumping Code
22 US-Pork DS7/R BISD 38S/30 9/18/1990 Subsidies Code
23 US-Stainless Steel Hollow Products ADP/47 8/20/1990 Antidumping Code
24 US-Non-Rubber Footwear SCM/94 BISD 42S/208 10/4/1989 Subsidies Code
*includes unadopted panel reports
President Bush, as part of his steel program announced last year, called for a multilateral
effort to address the excess capacity problems facing the industry and the subsidy practices
that have driven retention of inefficient capacity in many countries over time. Considering
the heavy incidence of steel trade cases in many countries over the years, a resolution of
one of the primary drivers of the intensity of trade actions in steel would be helpful in
reducing the number of trade actions that are brought. While there has been some discus-
sion within the OECD at the initiative of the Administration, to date there is no indication
of interest or willingness to pursue the issue aggressively by Member nations either within
the OECD or within the WTO. This author has argued for the last twelve years that nations
should look at the structural excess capacity issue not just for steel but for any industries
that find themselves in this situation.
While there are ways to attack some of the underlying causes of dumping (and while
governments could accept further limits on their ability to spend money), the question also
implies that there are too many cases being pursued internationally. This is not factually
supportable. In most countries, the percentage of trade covered by cases at any particular
time is small. Indeed, for major users like the United States, the European Union, and
Canada, coverage has historically been between 0.5 percent and 2.0 percent of imports. 2
22. See Terence P. Stewart et al., Opportunities in the WTO for Increased Liberalization of Goods: Making Sure
the Rules Work for All and that Special Needs are Addressed, 24 FORDHAM I-T'L LJ. 652, 677 (2000).
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V. Let's Make a Deal?-Unlikely
Not surprisingly, countries that have major problems with liberalization in certain sectors
(e.g., Japan, Korea, the European Union in agriculture, India on industrial and agricultural
products) have been amongst those pursuing an agenda in the Rules area that goes far
beyond the text of paragraph 28 of the Doha Declaration. Rules have historically been of
importance to the United States and, in fact, are of significant importance to industries in
many of the countries seeking major reopening of the texts as well. Thus, the attack on the
Rules that is being pursued in the Doha Round appears largely strategic, to force the United
States to accept a smaller package of trade liberalization in agriculture or to postpone the
time for conclusion of the overall negotiations.
Since the proposals put forward to date by nations on the Antidumping and SCM Agree-
ments go far beyond the mandate of paragraph 28,23 the likelihood of there being a deal in
this area, satisfactory to the various parties, seems remote at best. This Administration, like
those that have preceded it, has committed to maintaining strong trade laws so trade can
be fair as well as free. History has shown that the existence of strong trade remedies has
been critical to maintain domestic support for trade liberalization. This is true not only in
the United States but in many other countries as well. The United States has a lot of work
before it to ensure strong trade laws remain available for domestic industries. Failure in
this area will undermine the ability to move an aggressive agenda in other areas.
23. For example, India proposes to raise the de minimis level for dumping margins to 5 percent in investi-
gations and reviews of developing country imports. WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Proposals on Imple-
mentation Related Issues and Concerns: Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures/Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment, Submission by India, TN/RL/W/4 (Apr. 25, 2002), at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/tn/rV
W4.doc. Yet, India offers no basis for establishing a de minimis level that would exceed 100 percent of corporate
profitability. See Terence P. Stewart, Administration of the Antidumping Law: A Different Perspective, in DowN
IN THE DuMPs: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAws 288, 317-18 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan
eds., 1991). See also WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Antidumping: Illustrative Major Issues, Paperfrom Brazil;
Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Korea; Mexico; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; Thai-
land and Turkey, TN/RL/W/6 (Apr. 26, 2002), at hrtp://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/tn/ rl/W6.doc;
WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Second Contribution to Discussion of the Negotiating Group on Rules on Anti-
Dumping Measures, Paper by Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong; China; Israel; Japan; Korea; Norway;
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Singapore; Switzerland; and Thailand, TN/RU
W/10 (June 28, 2002), at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/tnrl/WlO.doc; WTO, Negotiating
Group on Rules, Submission from the European Communities Concerning the Agreement on Implementation ofArticle
VI of GA7T 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), TN/RL/W/13 (July 8, 2002), at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/tn/rlIXl3.doc; D. Pruzin, International Trade WTO Antidumping Reform Advocates Publish
Priorities for New Negotiations, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcUTIVEs, May 2, 2002, at Al (Japan and South Korea take
lead at Ministerial Conference to initiate WTO negotiations on rules).
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